significant, the EP should have been recognized in the literature as a strong parliament. To address these issues, I shall specify the conditions under which the EP can make use of its agenda-setting power.
The European Community fascinates observers and scholars because it is a unique object of study. Accordingly, a series of neologisms have been invented to describe it. It is "neither a state nor an international organization" (Sbragia 1992, 257) ; "less than a Federation, more than a Regime" (W. Wallace 1983, 403); "stuck between sovereignty and integration" (W. Wallace 1982, 67); a "part formed political system" (H. Wallace 1989, 205) ; "institutionalized intergovernmentalism in a supranational organization" (Cameron 1992, 66) , and the "middle ground between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking of a new one" (Scharpf 1988 Instead of using (appropriate or inappropriate) analogies in this analysis, I examine the logic and the outcomes of decision making among the three institutional actors generated by the cooperation procedure. In this sense, my approach is part of a series of studies that attempts to apply the institutional approach developed through the study of American politics to the institutions of the community (Garrett 1992; Garrett and Weingeist 1993; Scharpf 1988; Weber and Wiesmeth 1991).1
My results complement empirical studies. I explain why they find little influence for the EP in most cases. I explain why the EP in some instances (e.g., the automobile emission standards) was so influential. Finally, my analysis clarifies why cases involving high parliamentary influence are likely to multiply in the future.
The first section presents the rules of the cooperation procedure. The second section formally analyses the interaction among the three institutional actors (the EP, the Commission, and the Council of Ministers). The third section explores the implications of the analysis for the role of the EP. In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical problem of specifying the driving forces of European integration in light of the results of my model.
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Three major institutional actors are involved in European decision making: the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the EP. These actors interact according to quite complicated rules, and their decisions, along with those of the Court of Justice, supersede the national law of member countries. The Council is composed of the relevant ministers of the member countries (ministers of the environment for decisions concerning the environment, ministers of agriculture for agricultural matters, etc.). The Commission is composed of 17 members appointed by national governments for their competence and "whose independence is beyond doubt" and assures the everyday operation of the institutions of the Community. Finally, the EP is composed of 518 representatives elected (since 1979) by universal suffrage of the member countries of the community.
There are currently (before the application of the Maastricht treaty) three different legislative procedures in play: the assent procedure, the cooperation procedure, and the consultation procedure. Each of these attributes different powers to the three institutional actors. This is why, sometimes, a political and legal battle among the three actors takes place before the discussion of particular pieces of legislation in order to decide which procedure will be followed (Garrett 1992; Lodge 1987 Lodge , 1989 ). I shall not discuss these institutional battles here. Instead, I shall focus on presenting the cooperation procedure.
The cooperation procedure does not cover all areas of Community legislation (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 169; Lodge 1989, 69) . It applies to nine articles of the Rome treaty: prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality (art. 7); freedom of movement of workers (art. 49); freedom of establishment (art. 54.2); coordination of provisions providing special treatment of foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health (art. 56.2); mutual recognition of diplomas and the like and coordination of provisions on activities of self-employed persons (art. 57.1-2); harmonization of measures for the establishment and functioning of the internal market (art. 100a and b); the working environment and the health and safety of workers (art. 118a.2); economic and social cohesion (art. 130e); and research and development (art. 130q). Of all these issues, the most important has been the harmonization of the internal market and then social policies, research programs, and regional fund decisions. Legislation examined under the cooperation procedure constitutes between one-third and one-half of parliamentary decisions (Jacobs and Corbett 1990, 169).
The cooperation procedure entails two readings of each piece of legislation (initially introduced by the Commission) by the EP and the Council of Ministers. The Council makes the final decision either by qualified majority or by unanimity. In the abstract, the procedure is reminiscent of a navette system between the two houses of a bicameral legislature, where the upper house (the Council) has the final word.2 The European Community procedure is presented schematically in Figure 1 .
The legislative process begins with the submission of a Commission proposal to the EP. At the same time, the Council may begin deliberating but cannot reach a decision until it receives the EP's position. The EP may, in the first reading, accept, amend, or reject the proposal; it may also withhold its opinion by referring the legislation back to committee, thereby effectively aborting the proposal. Once the EP decides, the proposal goes back to the Commission, who may revise the initial proposal to accommodate the EP. The Commission presents the proposal, as amended, to the Council, who adopts a "common position" by qualified majority (54 out of 76 votes). There is, however, a very important restriction on the EP's second-reading amendment power. Amendments require absolute majorities to be adopted. In practice, the 260 required votes constitute a twothirds majority of members present. Moreover, given both that the 518 EP members from the 12 countries are organized into more than 10 (cross-national) parliamentary groups and that voting alignments occur more frequently by political group and less frequently by country and also that voting discipline is weak, 260 votes is a stringent requirement. The most likely combination to achieve an absolute majority is a coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats-the European People's party-that currently controls 301 seats.
To summarize, according to the cooperation procedure, in its second reading the EP can, by an absolute majority of its members, make a proposal that, if adopted by the Commission, can be accepted by a qualified majority (54/76) of the Council but requires unanimity of the Council to be modified. This proposal can be anywhere between the EP's and the Council's first reading of initial legislation, including a reiteration of the EPs previous, position. Consequently, if the EP manages to make a proposal that makes the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council better off than legislation that can be voted unanimously, this proposal will be adopted by all institutional actors. If, however, such a proposal does not exist or if the EP cannot adopt one by an absolute majority of its members or makes the wrong choice, then the agenda is transferred into the hands of the Council, which can modify the EP's proposal by unanimity. These conditions describe the power of the conditional agenda setter that is attributed to the EP by the cooperation procedure. I shall examine how this power has been used and then focus on its theoretical properties. The cooperation procedure presents a different mechanism for agenda-setting power. Regardless of impatience, it is more difficult for the Council to modify a Parliamentary proposal (provided it is accepted by the Commission) than to accept it. Indeed, qualified majority is needed for acceptance but unanimity for modification. This procedure may enable the EP to offer a proposal that makes a qualified majority of the Council better off than any unanimous decision. If such a proposal exists, if the EP is able to make it,4 and if the Commission adopts it, then the EP has agenda-setting powers. If, however, these conditions are not met, the EP looses its agendasetting power. This is why I characterize the EP's agenda power under the cooperation procedure as conditional.
CONDITIONAL AGENDA SETTING
I shall study the last reading of the cooperation procedure and provide necessary conditions for the existence of a winning EP proposal (i.e., a proposal that will be accepted by the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council). I will call such a proposal X.
In Since the unanimity position is not unique, I shall impose on parliamentary proposals a severe restriction. I shall require that in order to be accepted, they must be preferred by the Commission and by a qualified majority of the Council to any proposal that can be voted unanimously by the Council. This way we will have a (very conservative) estimate of the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP.
In Figure 2 , five out of the seven members of the Council can be made better off by proposals inside the qualified majority set of the unanimity set of the status quo, or Q(U(SQ)). Indeed, members 3-7 prefer any point inside this area over any point inside U(SQ). The area Q(U(SQ)) is generated by the intersection of five circles with centers the points 3-7 going through the edge of U(SQ)). Therefore, the EP can select inside the area Q(U(SQ)) the point that it prefers most, that is, the point closest to its own ideal point (provided that the Commission prefers it over U(SQ), which is the case in the figure). This is point X in Figure 2 .
However, such a winning proposal does not always exist, as the situation depicted in Figure 3 indicates. Here, the status quo is further away from the positions of the Council (the heptagon 1-7); consequently, the Council has a wide set of options on its own (by unanimity). There is no proposal that can defeat, by qualified majority, all points inside U(SQ). For example, a five-member majority consisting of members 3-7 is impossible, because the circles around 3 and 7 tangent to U(SQ) do not intersect. The same is true for all other possible majorities.
Another interesting case exists when the status quo is inside the heptagon 1-7. In this case, the Council cannot modify the status quo by unanimity, because at least one member will object to any particular move. Consequently, the status quo can be modified only through a parliamentary proposal. Figure 4 indicates that in this case, the EP can select one of several possible coalitions. The top lens of Q(U(SQ)) is preferred to the status quo by a coalition of members 3-7. (It is generated by the intersection of circles around 3 and 7.) The bottom lens is preferred by a coalition of 1-5. The middle lens is preferred by the coalition 2-6 (intersection of circles around 2 and 6). In this case, the EP will propose X and will be supported by the Commission and the coalition of states 2-6.
In these examples, the EP was sometimes able to make a winning proposal (Figures 2 and 4 First of all, if the status quo is located inside the heptagon 1-7 (the Pareto set), it cannot be changed by the unanimity of the Council: at least one member will object to any particular move. Second, in two dimensions, for the qualified majority specified by the cooperation procedure (54/76), there is a central area of the Council (technically the 54/76-core, hereafter the Q-core). If the status quo is inside the Q-core, it cannot be modified by any 54/76 majority coalition. So if the status quo is located in the Q-core, it cannot be modified by either the EP's proposal or by the Council on its own. The Q-core is re presented in Figure 5 by the heptagon 1'2'3'4'5'6'7'. one country persuaded the others that there was no unanimously preferred change of the status quo, so they had to accept the EP's proposal by qualified majority. To summarize, a 54/76-core is guaranteed to exist in two dimensions. In this case, the curvilinear property described in Theorem 2 holds: when the status quo is inside the Q-core or far away from it, there is no winning parliamentary proposal, so that the EP's conditional agenda-setting power is null. But whenever the status quo occupies some intermediate position, a winning parliamentary proposal (assuming adoption by the Commission) is either guaranteed or may exist. This is the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP in two dimensions.
What happens in more than two relevant dimensions? In this case, a Q-core is not guaranteed to exist. The implication of the absence of a Q-core is that no point inside the Pareto set is invulnerable. There is always at least one coalition of 54/76 votes in the Council that will be made better off by a change of the status quo. If the EP can identify these coalitions and the changes they are willing to support, it can propose the one that it most prefers. In other words, the set of alternatives available to the EP increases when there is no Q-core. On the other hand, if the status quo is far away from the Pareto set, there is no winning proposal from the EP.
One additional interesting feature of conditional agenda setting is the importance of information.
According to the informational property (Theorem 3 in the Appendix), when the EP's information about
what the Council will unanimously do increases, its agenda-setting power increases. In the limiting case, when the EP knows exactly which point inside the Pareto set the Council will select, it will always have agenda-setting power (unless there is a Q-core and the Council decides to select a point inside it). As we saw earlier, the EP and the Council fought bitterly about the informational content of the common position rendered by the Council. Some commentators regarded this struggle and the subsequent shift in the Council's position as "preconditions for rationalizing and coordinating the legislative procedure" (Bieber 1988 Little can be made of these first-versus-secondreading statistics, because without further investigation, we cannot assess the importance of the EP's amendments, nor consequently, can we tell whether amendments were accepted in the first reading because they would have been accepted in the second, whether the Council accepted some amendments in order to weaken the Parliamentary majority and make the EP unable to offer amendments in the second reading, or whether the Council accepted the less-important amendments in the first round. However, what clearly emerges is that of every four EP amendments, two are accepted, one is rejected by the Commission, and one is rejected by the Council. This mixed result can be well understood within the conditional agenda-setting framework: the EP has conditional agenda-setting power; consequently, it may find proposals with the property of making both the Commission and a qualified majority in the Council better off than the status quo. The reason successful amendments are not the rule is that such proposals do not always exist.
Comparisons with Other Analyses
The model I present combines the existing evidence to make several points, including the importance of information and the curvilinear property and the fact that the cooperation procedure can generate paradoxes. However, two findings are especially important: (1) the conditional agenda setter, under the conditions specified by the model, has an important input in decision making; and (2) According to my account, the EP has agendasetting power as long as it can make a winning proposal in the second stage of the cooperation procedure. There are essentially four relevant points, which I shall discuss in turn.
Existence of an Absolute Majority in the European Parliament. This is the requirement for successful parliamentary proposals that I have least discussed. I avoided it by assuming that the EP was a unified actor and by studying the internal divisions of the Council. However, as I said earlier, the 260-vote requirement for a second-round proposal is not a trivial matter. It essentially requires congruence on the part of socialists and Christian democrats from different countries. This is not a frequently observed alliance at the national level.12 I think that such a coalition can be formed more frequently on social or quality-of-life issues (environment, health, education, and research) than on economic issues. To the extent that the former prevail on the agenda, the EP will see its influence increased. Position of the Status Quo. An unconditional agenda setter has more power when the status quo is far away, because then the former has more leeway to make a "take it or leave it" offer. In contrast, the European EP (a conditional agenda setter) has less power the further away the status quo, because there are many positions that the Council can adopt on its own by unanimity to avoid both the status quo and the EP's position. It is reasonable to assume that throughout the history of the European Community the status quo has continued to move toward more integration. If this assumption is accepted and if integration continues, then as the status quo approaches or gets inside the Pareto set of the Council, the EP's role is likely to increase. The simple displacement of the status quo toward more integration will transform winning parliamentary proposals into the rule. Obviously, this is a ceteris paribus prediction, and it assumes the same institutional structure (the current cooperation procedure) and the same distribution of tastes among the different actors. I shall conclude by arguing that the concept of conditional agenda setting can help us understand the process of integration differently from the major competing theories. The cooperation procedure provides a formal expression of the conditional agenda-setting concept. The idea is simple-delegation of powers as long as certain limits are not crossed and loss of these powers otherwise. One can hardly think of a principal-agent relation where the delegation of powers is unconditional. Simple and universal though the concept of conditional delegation may be, the cooperation procedure presents the rare feature of specifying the conditions, instead of leaving them to an implicit understanding."4 One important feature of the cooperation procedure is that the outcome is not necessarily Pareto optimal for the states. In this sense, it is not necessarily an efficient institution (Tsebelis 1990 , chap. 4) . However, most of the time the outcome will be inside the heptagon defined by the ideal positions of the states. But which Pareto optimal outcome will be selected? Krasner (1991) But conditional agenda setting by the EP presents some more desirable features. The speed of integration is under the final control of governments. Most of the time the outcome will be inside the Pareto set of the Council, but in any case the Council is able to overrule the EP if it pushes integration too fast.
Another important advantage of European institutions is that they diffuse responsibility for unpopular measure from national governments to some combination of supranational institutions who were able to impose their will despite existing objections.
Other European institutions offer the same advantages. In the consultation procedure, the Commission has the role of the conditional agenda setter. In the cases that the Council can decide by qualified majority, the mechanism of delegation of agenda-setting powers is exactly the same: the Council needs qualified majority to agree and unanimity to modify.
When the European Court of Justice made the decision concerning cassis de dijon, thereby creating the doctrine of mutual recognition, it was making a decision that was bound to be in serious disagreement with important social interests in all member countries at some time or another. Similarly, the Court practically rewrote the interpretation of the Community value-added-tax directive. Such measures were subsequently adopted by the Single European Act (i.e., by the unanimity of governments). In all these case, governments in disagreement can opt out of the application of particular legislation or even of the system altogether. It is up to the supranational actor to make decisions that will carry the Community further along, rather than lead to disagreement, dissent, and ultimately to disintegration.
Conditional agenda-setting powers are likely to increase in the future for two reasons: (1) the status quo approaches the positions of the members of the Council; and (2) issues become more complicated, so that a 54/76 qualified majority core is not likely to exist. As I demonstrated earlier, both features lead to increase in powers of the conditional agenda setter.
In conclusion, European integration happens, among other reasons, because national governments have built institutions attributing conditional agendasetting power to supranational actors. If in the future popular sentiment wants to reduce the speed of integration, the citizens of Europe may use the electoral process to make sure that some particular points of view are present in or absent from the EP; that is, they may change the EP's policy position. Altering the position of the EP in Figures 2-6 would not affect the agenda-setting powers of the EP (it will still be able to make winning proposals under the conditions I have specified), but it does affect the content of the winning proposals, that is, the outcomes of the cooperation procedure. qualified majority is needed to approve and unanimity, to modify. Bieber comes to the conclusion that the translation of the Single European Act in different languages is ambiguous and, therefore, that unanimity is required (1988, 719). However, on several occasions, the Council has decided by qualified majority, so in the remainder of my account, I will assume that only qualified majority is required for the adoption of a common position. The four largest countries, (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) have ten votes each; Spain has eight votes; Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal have five each; Denmark and Ireland have three votes each and Luxembourg has two votes, making a total of 76 votes on the Council.
4. The reader is reminded that 260 votes are required for a proposal.
5. I select a two-dimensional representation instead of the (marginally simpler) one-dimensional one, for four reasonsfirst and foremost, because one-dimensional models typically produce equilibrium results (Shepsle 1979) , while two-dimensional ones not only generically lack such equilibria but produce chaotic behavior, that is, cycles all over the space (McKelvey 1976) . The model here includes a mechanism for equilibrium selection that the reader will not be able to identify unless the generic model has the possibility of producing chaotic results (i.e., is at least two-dimensional). Second, the results from two dimensions are easily generalizable to more than two dimensions, which is the most realistic assumption in the politics of the European Community. Third, two dimensions is the minimum required to give the EP the possibility of selecting a supporting coalition inside the Council. Finally, as it will become clear later, the one example of the cooperation procedure that I shall present cannot be represented in a less than two-dimensional space (in fact, at that point, it will become clear that the representation of the status quo requires more than one dimension).
6. What Denmark does in this case is nest the international game of European policymaking inside its domestic politics game in order to achieve a credible threat (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990 ).
7. It is easy to verify that any point outside the heptagon 1'-7' can be defeated by its projection on the closest side of this heptagon by a 54/76 qualified majority. 14. Other cases of such conditional delegation that I can think of are the veto power of the American president (conditional upon not violating the will of 2/3 of either House of Congress), the power of the German president to nominate the chancellor (conditional upon selecting a candidate acceptable to the Bundestag in the first round), and legislative veto in the United States.
